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A number of past sociopolitical studies have attempted to highlight the ways in which
generational identity, which develops when people come of age in different times, affects
political attitudes. In this study, I investigate generational influence on the degree to which
individuals embrace collectivist values, as considered by examinations of social policy attitudes
and trust in government. A measure of attitudes towards social policies arguably represent
collectivist values because social policy is designed to prioritize the group over the individual. A
subsequent measure of trust in government augments the discussion of collectivist values
because the formation of democratic political institutions occurred out of the necessity for
widespread collective problem-solving. Regression analyses across the various models indicate
that generation has little to no effect on collectivist values. Instead, political ideology,
socioeconomic status, and sociodemographic status are more indicative of collectivist values in
the United States.
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CHAPTER I: GENERATIONS AND POLITICS
The American political environment has long been rife with generational conflict, which
was noticeably prevalent throughout the 2016 election cycle. Tensions between older generations
and younger generations manifested over a variety of mediums, including mainstream news
media and social media. Not unlike previous generations, Millennials experienced explosive
development in information and communications technology; however, Millennials were the first
generation to grow and develop after the genesis of the Internet and the ability to access
information instantaneously. Additionally, Millennials developed through their young adult lives
in the midst of the largest economic collapse since the Great Depression and two wars. While
previous generations were also exposed to war and recessions over the course of the 20th
Century, the development of the Information Age altered the way that younger generations in
recent history were exposed to these profound events. As a result, the Millennials’ worldview
and the ways in which they behave may be fundamentally different than previous generations.
The conflict between the American generations is interesting to juxtapose with political
attitudes. Mainstream media often labels Millennials as selfish individuals who do not care about
anything but their own self-interest. Additionally, they are often charged with desiring free
handouts while wanting to avoid the labor force and expecting to have everything handed to
them. Despite these seemingly contrasting characterizations, younger generations may not be any
of these things; rather, the differences may simply lie in the values of a particular generation.
People within a society that are more communal may favor a collection of resources for
collective use. Other groups may prefer to prioritize the individual, rather than the collective. In
this study, I hypothesize that younger generations are moving away from an individualist society
and are gravitating towards a more communal society than previous generations.
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With the increasingly evident tension between previous generations and Millennials
juxtaposed with the ever-increasing polarization of the political climate in the United States, an
opportunity for investigation is unveiled: Are younger American generations, specifically
Millennials, more collective than past generations? Additionally, do Millennials trust political
institutions more than previous generations? If not, what factors can explain differences in levels
of collectivist values in America?
Generational differences in these values are important to understand because of the
potential consequences for American policy. Because politics is a zero-sum game, policymakers
cannot implement both individualist and collectivist policy, but they can find some compromise
between the two. Many different policy areas, such as taxation, economic management,
healthcare, and labor laws, are affected by the individualist/collectivist contrast. If a generation is
moving towards one and away from another, the future of American policy may need to change
to better adapt to, and balance, the shifting values that the upcoming generations bear.

Generations
Generation is a crucial variable in determining political identity and values. There is a
distinct difference between social generation and familial generation, but I look specifically at
social generation. Social generations are groups of people born within the same period of time
and because I am trying to identify how similar events affect different generations, social
generation is more appropriate for this study. Mannheim, who attempted to categorize American
citizens based on a number of contextual factors (Mannheim 1923), heavily influenced the
application of generation within social science. Historical, political, and social context are all
factors that have to be accounted for when a particular group of people, or a cohort, reach an age
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of maturity that influences their collective perspective. These ages can be some kind of
milestone, such as reaching adulthood. Different generations coexist within the same time and
context. They live throughout the same years and witness the same events, but the different
generations are at separate stages of development and therefore experience the time and events in
different, subjective ways (Mannheim 1923).
Generations therefore have substantially different perspectives of their society, and
consequently hold differing values. “Individuals who belong to the same generation… are
endowed, to that extent, with a common location in the historical dimension of social progress”
(Mannheim 1923, 290). Further studies that were based on Mannheim’s conceptualization of
generations assert that generational perspectives remain the same throughout the course of a
person’s life, indicating that they are not fluid (Whittier 1997). As a result, exposure to similar
events at different times of one’s life can form life-long perspectives in different ways,
depending on one’s stage in life, altering generational values.
One of the ways in which generational variations benefit society as a whole is that they
“immortalize a mortal species” (Ryder 1965). Human beings are susceptible to death, but
civilization lives on through “demographic metabolism” wherein the life and death cycles of
generations creates different exposure to different events at different stages of generational
development (Ryder 1965). This allows civilizations that last longer than the lives of their
occupants to continue and develop based on learned lessons from past experiences. If a
civilization were to contain only one immortal generation, values would remain stagnant with a
uniform exposure to differing events. In order to develop and progress as a civilization, valuebased policies and actions may need to be challenged and adjusted based on contemporary
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situations. Policymakers should therefore be made aware of generational differences in values so
as to best represent the society as a whole.

Political Socialization
In addition to his more general description of the manner in which generation influences
social change, Ryder describes the specific effects of familial influences on individual
development (1965). He asserts that familial socialization is one of the earliest stages of
development for children, but adds that socialization is a continuous process throughout life and
manifests itself in a number of different ways. Political socialization is the process by which a
person develops their ideas about politics and their political values. One of the foundational
studies of generations and political values, conducted by Jennings and Niemi, surveyed high
school seniors and their parents to investigate political socialization across generations (1974).
Jennings and Niemi found that parental values were quite influential on the younger family
members, but that highly significant events can alter the preconceived political opinions
developed from the familial influence. They assert that, while younger generations do not stray
too far from previous generations, significant events can deflect upcoming generations from
adapting some of the values that their parents held (1981). Niemi and Sobieszek elucidate
differences between life cycle effects, period effects, and generational effects (1977). Life cycle
effects are things that affect everyone as they reach a certain age, such as adult maturity. Period
effects are time-based and span multiple generations, such as the consistent decline in political
trust observed during the 1960s across the entire population. Finally, generational effects are
unique to one generation and have lasting effects on one specific cohort as they experienced it.
These effects are based on both time and events and will socialize an individual differently based
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on the individual’s experience, which may alter the values that the individual adapts. Those
events thus alter political socialization at a generational level, and these effects are what I am
primarily concerned with in this study.
While familial influences on political socialization are notable in accordance with
previous research, event-based socialization can explain the development of political attitudes
across generations. Valentino and Sears posit that political socialization can occur in response to
significant events (1998). More specifically, adolescent exposure to certain political events, such
as presidential campaigns, have been shown to develop from political communications coming
from those events. The political communication is a non-familial type of socialization for the
children and adolescents that are exposed to it, and subsequently influence the values that those
children gain. This evidence suggests that generations can be socialized differently as they
mature based on different events. A presidential campaign in 1980, and the affiliated
communication mechanisms, is different than a presidential campaign in 2016. The variations in
those events affect the developing generations differently.

Individualism versus Collectivism
Some research on generation indicates that there is a systematic, cyclical operation of
generational differences (Strauss and Howe, 1997). It is possible that generations operate in a
four-part cycle that repeats approximately every 80-100 years as a saeculum. Strauss and Howe
label the four parts as different turnings which last for approximately one generation each. The
descriptions of the four turnings are as follows (Strauss and Howe 1997, 12):
The High: An upbeat era of strengthening institutions and weakening individualism,
when a new civic order implants and the old values regime decays.
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The Awakening: A passionate era of spiritual upheaval, when the civic order comes under
attack from a new values regime.
The Unraveling: A down-cast era of strengthening individualism and weakening
institutions, when the old civic order decays and the new values regime implants.
The Crisis: A decisive era of secular upheaval, when the values regime propels the
replacement of the old civic order with a new one.
In line with Ryder’s characterization of generations, these turnings enable the development of
human society. “Together, the four turnings of the saeculum comprise history’s seasonal rhythm
of growth, maturation, entropy, and destruction” (Strauss and Howe 1997, 12). The authors posit
that these cycles have operated over the last 24 generations in recent human history, but the 11th
of those 24 became the first distinctly American generation. Strauss and Howe suggest that
Millennials would develop during an impending crisis, which may be the War on Terror or the
2007-2008 Recession. As a result, they should be more collective in order to come together to
recover from the crisis. This assessment approaches these events as if they are generational
effects, rather than period effects. For example, the recession influenced the Silent Generation,
Baby Boomers, Generation X, and the Millennial Generation, but Strauss and Howe suggest that
the event affected those individual generations differently. Because the event does not uniformly
affect all generations in the same way, it is not a period effect. Instead, the different effects
across generations would indicate that it is a generational effect. For example, Americans from
both younger and older generations likely experienced financial hardship as a result of the
recession, but it may have affected a younger citizen’s ability to go to college or buy a house,
while it may have limited an older citizen’s ability to retire. While each generation is affected by
the same event, the effects are different across varying generations.
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The cyclical model of generations that Strauss and Howe employ are quite different than
other possible explanations. In fact, the cycle suggests that differing generational attitudes are
not stagnant, in which older generations act and feel one way and younger generations feel
another. Rather, the Strauss-Howe generational theory posits that the generations will maintain
their individual or collective attitudes based on the time that they developed those values, and
that elements of those initial values will remain intact over the course of that generation’s life.
This is counter to an age-effect perspective where it would be expected that as a cohort matures,
they would adopt different values than when that cohort was younger and experiencing different
life-cycle events.
A contrasting argument to the Strauss-Howe generational theory is that, because of
intergenerational resource competition, older generations are more likely to support higher levels
of taxation and spending (MacManus 1995). This is more in line with an age-effect perspective.
It is argued that the opposite effect of the Strauss-Howe theory actually takes place, but for
differing reasons. Self-centeredness and altruism has been commonly discussed in the discourse
on generational values. Younger generations are commonly labeled as self-centered, with the
suspicion that young generations want an increase in taxation and spending (MacManus 1995).
Generations are often pitted against one another in a seemingly combative manner under the
assumption that different generations require different resources at separate periods in time.
MacManus argues and finds that older generations require more resources and as a result, are
more likely to support seemingly-collective social policy that provides resources at the expense
of younger generations.
The MacManus study argues that older generations are actually more supportive of
increased taxation and spending because of intergenerational resource competition and their
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higher consumption of resources than younger generations, but a third theory is rooted in the fact
that some studies have shown that some parts of the American population are more publicregarding than private-regarding (Wilson and Banfield 1964, 1971; Wolfinger and Field 1966).
Public-regarding policy is more politically collective while private-regarding is more politically
individualistic. Wilson and Banfield find that there is a difference in the support for publicregarding policies based on a number of factors. They suggest that support for public-regarding
policies are more reliant upon socioeconomic and sociodemographic status. Additionally,
Wolfinger and Field note ethnic differences in support for public-regarding policies as a followup to Wilson and Banfield (1966). This explanation relies on conventional wisdom which asserts
that poorer people desire more spending because they receive more benefits from social
programs, while richer people would oppose more spending because they would need to pay
more in taxes to support those programs, while not necessarily requiring the benefits distributed
by the programs in question.
In comparison to other countries, the United States is seen as an individualistic country
(Triandis and Gelfand, 1998; Silvadas, Bruvold, and Nelson 2008; Chen and West 2008), but the
purpose of this study is to identify if there is variation between collectivism and individualism
within American generations specifically, particularly with the Millennial generation. Generation
is not a phenomenon that is unique to one country. Some scholars suggest that social sciences are
too narrow in their scope of investigation with regards to generations. Consequently, a global
conception of generations may provide a better understanding of political and sociological
interconnectedness by eliminating “methodological nationalism” from social studies that
downplay the role of national interaction (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2009). Despite this
argument, I focus on American generations for a number of reasons. First, Strauss and Howe use
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generations as their core unit of analysis in their discussion of American history. Secondly, the
data available under the American National Election Survey is strictly limited to respondents
from the United States. The nature of the survey data allows specific institutional questions
regarding spending to be raised in order to gather information about political attitudes. I isolate
American generations because of the challenge in presenting a unified international identity due
to differing political context of separate nations. Finally, in light of the recent elections and the
rise of populist candidates on both sides of the partisan scale, understanding contemporary
American political values is imperative.

Institutional Collectivism
In an effort to elucidate the ways in which the turnings affect generational characteristics,
Strauss and Howe define different archetypes that people acquire as they come of age during
different historical events. The archetypes are Prophets, Nomads, Heroes, and Artists, and the
descriptions of these archetypes are extensive, but the most important aspects for the purpose of
this study are the generational opinions towards institutions. These archetypes are forged out of
the generational cycles that Strauss and Howe describe. For example, the Hero archetype
develops when a generation is born during an Unraveling and comes of age during a Crisis, as
they are the ones who bear the burden of resolving whatever problems come with it. According
to the archetype descriptions, Prophets and Nomads are less favorable of strong institutions while
Heroes and Artists are more supportive of strengthening institutions as a result of efforts to
collectively recover from Crises.
Strauss and Howe suggest that Millennials were born during the most recent Unraveling
and came of age during the most recent Crisis, which may be the War on Terror and/or the 2007-
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2008 Recession. As a result, they will assume the Hero archetype, which is born during the
Unraveling period, and support strengthening institutions more than the previous two
generations. The Silent Generation, which assumed the Artist archetype, should be more
favorable towards political institutions since they were the other living generation to have come
been born during a Crisis (in their case, the Great Depression and WWII). Strauss and Howe wed
these archetypes to the different turnings by suggesting that the nature of the turnings define the
generations in specific, repeatable ways. Hero and Artist archetypes are always those that are
born during Unravelings and Crises, respectively (Strauss and Howe 1997, 49). The events
socialize them in a manner that requires them to collectively solve the problems that their
individual generations face. If the Strauss-Howe generational theory is to be supported, a cycle
of attitudes in favor of collectivist policy and support for institutional strength should be evident
with these two generations. According to their theory, the Baby Boomers and Generation X
should hold a more individualistic set of values because they lack exposure to catastrophic events
that necessitate collective problem-solving. The Silent Generation and Millennial Generations
should thus support collectivist policies and political institutions, while the Baby Boomers and
Generation X should oppose collectivist policies and political institutions.
Generational changes in political institutions are important to investigate. Institutional
strength in a democratic society is a representation of the will of the people and a direct measure
of governmental power. Governmental power as expressed through bureaucratic institutional
strength can create issues for agents that disagree with the agenda of the formal government in a
democratic state, as they have the backing of the police and military that view the agenda as
legitimate (Moe 2005). Additionally, the legitimacy of institutions enables democratic
governments to act as a global power, due in part because of their ability to be recognized by
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other nations (Mansfield and Snyder 2002). Consequently, policymakers may need to understand
attitudes towards political institutions as an element of international power projection. Despite
Moe’s ominous operation of the government, the Strauss-Howe theory discusses the strength of
institutions through an individualist-collectivist framework of problem-solving (Strauss and
Howe 1997). They argue that strong institutionalism comes with higher levels of collectivism, as
strong institutions are indicative of a group-oriented society and result from a desire to
collectively overcome a Crisis. Some scholars suggest that the relationship between collective
problem solving and institutions is more about capabilities rather than strength (McDermott
2007), but Strauss and Howe specifically use the language of strength instead of general
capability. In order to consolidate these differences, I use trust in the government to do what is
right as a means of addressing both favorability of the government and overall capability.

Theoretical Framework
Three competing theories about collectivism, and consequently, institutions, are thus
presented: First, Strauss and Howe suggest that Millennials and the Silent Generation are more
collective because development through a crisis leads them to recognize that collective solutions
are appropriate. Second, MacManus suggests that older generations are more positive towards
taxation and spending because of limited availability of resources, and are therefore collective,
but out of self-centeredness rather than altruism. Finally, Wilson and Banfield suggest that
generational differences in political attitudes do not affect collectivist values. Instead, differences
in socioeconomic and sociodemographic status lead citizens to be more collective.
These theories guide both studies. The first study is a direct measure of collectivist
attitudes through a desire to engage in policy that is either collective or individualistic.
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A respondent who is opposed to federal spending on social programs is not likely to be
supportive of a collectivist approach to problem-solving, as they are not group-oriented. The
second study is a measure of the manifestation of collectivist attitudes through political
institutions. Government institutions are a tool for collective problem-solving, and those who are
favorable of collectivism should have higher trust in those government institutions.
In this study, I aim to identify whether or not pre-existing and competing generational
theories can explain aspects of political behavior. Particularly, I aim to answer the
aforementioned questions regarding generations as a whole by employing American political
attitudes at the time of the most recent election. This takes two forms: first, does generation
affect political attitudes towards collectivist policies? Second, does generation affect attitudes
towards political institutions? Two separate analyses are conducted based on the aforementioned
theoretical framework.

12

CHAPTER II: ATTITUDES TOWARDS COLLECTIVIST POLICIES
The elucidation of generational differences in attitude towards certain political policies
may shed some light on the ways in which historical and political context alters the fundamental
values that distinct groups of people formulate and retain over the course of their lives.
Measurable differences in sociopolitical values may be indicative of a generational trend in
accordance with a few different previously-established theories. A more nuanced discussion
about the extent to which generations vary in their preferences for collective or individualist
policies may serve to ease a hotly-contested issue within contemporary political engagement, as
is commonly referenced across a variety of media outlets.

Research Methodology
Social programs have long been a salient topic, both in public discourse and government
policy agendas. For example, American policymakers in the 20th Century adjusted the levels of
spending on social programs several times, particularly during changes in presidential
administrations. Federal spending on social programs can serve as a representation of the extent
to which a population is collective or individualistic. “Collectivism was defined as a set of
feelings, beliefs, behavioral intentions, and behaviors related to solidarity and concern for
others” (Hui 1998). Opinion towards federal spending on social services is therefore a potential
way of discerning the level of collectivism through political attitudes. Collectivists hold
favorable attitudes towards sharing the burden and troubles of others and emphasize the social
environment and interpersonal relationships over the individual (Bond et al. 1982; Leung and
Bond 1984; Hui et al., 1991; Hui 1998; Triandis 1989). Previous studies have also demonstrated
that collectivist societies are more likely to provide similar rewards for differing levels of input
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in order to maintain group harmony (Chen 1995, Leung and Bond 1984, Kim et al. 1990). Some
studies have indicated that voters act irrationally by supporting public-regarding policies despite
the fact that support for those policies creates a cost for them as individuals (Wilson and Banfield
1964, 1971). In line with these methods of thinking, public-regarding policies such as social
services are operationalized as collectivist. Consequently, collectivists should support higher
levels of spending on social services that are aimed at alleviating socioeconomic problems and
promoting the general welfare of fellow citizens at the expense of their own individual benefit,
regardless of whether or not those people are capable of equally contributing to the society.
Some suggest that an increase in spending on social programs elevates the overall
satisfaction of life for those of lower socioeconomic status (Radcliff 2001), which is why it
might be important to identify if generational differences influence the amount of spending on
social services. According to the Congressional Budget Office (2017), just under 20% of the
United States Gross Domestic Product is from revenue made from individual income tax, payroll
tax, and corporate income tax. Given that federal spending on social services is a result of taxing
individual Americans, political attitudes towards spending on social services is used as a way to
operationalize collectivist attitudes for the purpose of this study. Additional support for this
operationalization is that some scholars suggest that more socialist countries are more collectivist
(Radcliff 2001). Socialist countries are, in part, defined by the presence of social programs, and
given the collectivist focus on groups and interpersonal relationships, support for wider-reaching
social programs may be interpreted as an increase in collectivism.
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The Data
In order to identify trends in American political attitudes, I use survey data from the 2016
American National Election Study. The ANES is a collection of survey questions and responses
from studies that are conducted every four years during the presidential elections. The ANES
sample included both face-to-face and online modes of interviews. The face-to-face sample had
1,181 pre-election respondents and 1,059 post-election respondents. The online sample had
3,090 pre-election respondents and 2,590 respondents. After dropping respondents who did not
participate in both the pre-election and post-election interviews, there were 2,641 remaining
respondents for the first three models which combined both the online and face-to-face
interviews. All respondents were US eligible voters. This data nearly covers the full
demographic range of American citizens that I want to study. The only exclusion is the tail-end
of the Millennial generation that is not yet old enough to vote.

The Variables
The first dependent variable for the study is attitude towards federal spending on aid to
the poor. Attitudes are measured from responses to the sentence “Government should provide
many fewer/more services for aid to the poor” and ranked from 1-3. A response of “1” is the
statement that government should provide many more services, while a response of “2” is the
statement that government should provide many fewer services. The third response is that
government spending should remain the same. For my study, this variable was recoded in order
to make it an ordinal scale from 1 to 3. The first category was recoded to respondent support for
a decrease in spending on aid to the poor, the second category is respondent support for a
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maintenance of current spending on aid to the poor, and the third category was recoded to be
respondent support for an increase in spending on aid to the poor.
In order to expand the scope of collectivism, a second dependent variable is used in a
similar model as the first. Attitudes towards federal spending on welfare programs is employed.
The attitudes are measured with responses to the sentence “Government should provide
more/fewer services for welfare programs” and are ranked on an ordinal scale from 1-3. A
response of “1” is the statement that government should increase resources for welfare programs,
while a response of “3” is the statement that government should decrease amount of resources
for welfare programs. A response of “2” is the statement that government spending on welfare
programs should remain the same. This variable was recoded in the same ordinal manner as the
first, from 1 to 3, where 1 is coded as support for a decrease in spending, 2 is coded as support
for maintenance of current spending, and 3 is coded as support for an increase in spending.
Finally, a third model employing attitudes towards an increase in government spending
on healthcare is used. This model specifically is employed because of the nature of the resources
required as a part of healthcare in order to examine if resource requirements affect generational
attitudes. The variable is coded in the same way that the previous dependent variables are. A
response of “1” is the statement that government should increase spending on healthcare, while
an argument of “3” is the statement that government should reduce spending on healthcare.
Finally, a response of “2” is the statement that government spending on healthcare should remain
the same. Ideally, a future study would include public higher education as a variable to
demonstrate one policy area that would benefit younger generations more than older generations.
The first independent variable is age, which is recoded to identify generational
differences. Although generational definitions are somewhat arbitrary, the United States Census
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Bureau and the Pew Research Center have created artificial labels for them, which will be used
as the standard for this study. The Pew Research Center defines Americans born between 1928
and 1945 as the Silent Generation. The United States Census Bureau identifies B
aby Boomers as anyone born from the age of 1946 through 1964. The Pew Research Center
defines Generation X as anyone born between 1965 and 1980, but 1981 is included in this
generation in order to accommodate the Pew Research Center’s definition of Generation X and
the United States Census Bureau’s definition of Millennials. The U.S Census Bureau identifies
Millennials as anyone born between 1982 and 2000, so 1981 was selected to reconcile the two.
The American National Election Study measures date of birth ranging from 1921 through
1997. This data was then recoded based on the above definitions of generation. Respondents who
are ages 18-35 were placed into the Millennial category. Respondents who are ages 36-52 are
placed into the Generation X category1. Respondents who are 53-72 are categorized as Baby
Boomers, and respondents who are ages 73 and above are categorized as the Silent Generation.
Not all Millennials are of voting age and therefore were not sampled for the American National
Election Survey, but given their inability to vote, it should not matter much for the sake of this
study. They are cut off in the year 1997, excluding three years of the Millennial generation. Data
from the upcoming 2020 American National Election Survey would push the entire Millennial
generation over the minimum voting age and might offer a more accurately representative
sample.
The second independent variable is ideological self-identification. This variable was
measured on a seven-point scale. Partisan identification was also included, but multicollinearity
was discovered with political ideology and partisan identification, so partisan identification was
omitted. Respondents who answered 1, 2, or 3 for “very liberal,” “somewhat liberal,” or “liberal”

17

were recoded and grouped together. Respondents who answered 4 were categorized as
moderates. Finally, respondents who answered 5, 6, or 7 for “conservative,” “somewhat
conservative,” or “very conservative” respectively were recoded and grouped together. The
recoding of this variable flatly denotes liberal ideology, moderate ideology, and conservative
ideology. Conventional wisdom indicates that political ideology is a strong indicator of
preferences towards government spending, so this variable is controlled in order to more
carefully identify the influence of generation on attitudes towards government-provided social
services. Negative opinions of government spending would likely indicate more negative
opinions towards social services and vice versa, so controlling for ideology is necessary in order
to accurately isolate and reflect generational differences, if any exist. Table 1 displays a crosstabulation of generations and political ideology. This table corroborates data from the Pew
Research Center which indicates that a higher percentage of Millennials are Liberal, while the
older generations see a sharp increase in percentage of Conservatives (Maniam and Smith 2017).

Table 1
Cross-tabulation of Respondent Generation and Ideology
Generations (%)

Millennials
Generation X
Baby Boomers
Silent
Generation
Total

Ideology (%)
Liberal
351
(42.65)
177
(29.26)
283
(28.91)
56
(23.93)
867
(32.83)

Moderate
205
(24.91)
180
(29.75)
255
(26.05)
61
(26.07)
701
(26.54)
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Conservative
267
(32.44)
248
(40.99)
441
(45.05)
117
(50.00)
1073
(40.63)

Total
823
(100.00)
605
(100.00)
979
(100.00)
234
(100.00)
2641
(100.00)

Sociodemographic and socioeconomic status are the remaining independent variables in
the study. Sex and race are included within the regression to control for sociodemographic status
when isolating generations. Race has six categories: White, Black, Asian, Native American,
Hispanic, and Other. Finally, income is included to identify differing generational attitudes
across socioeconomic levels. Race and sex are categorical and are thus included in the
regressions as factor variables. Conventional wisdom indicates that poorer people more
frequently support higher spending on social programs, possibly because they are more likely to
benefit from them. Wealthier people less frequently support spending on social programs,
possibly because they do not benefit from them as much as low socioeconomic persons, so it is
imperative to control for income levels when isolating generational effects on attitudes towards
those programs.
There are a few limitations for this study that researchers may want to address in the
future. In addition to a larger sample size, a dependent variable that focused on potential
resources to younger generations may be advantageous. Healthcare is a one-sided policy that
benefits older generations more than younger, healthier generations, so it would be more
beneficial to include a dependent variable such as government-funded higher education that
would place younger generations as the primary beneficiary to such policy, and the level of
collectivism across different generations may or may not be apparent. Finally, the American
National Election Study did not provide a variable that sufficiently explained levels of political
knowledge. Assessing political knowledge with a study such as this would be beneficial, as it
would reflect whether or not respondents towards increasing spending actually know that the
programs and policies are costing them a certain amount of their own resources. Respondents
who are more collective may be content with increasing their cost in order to benefit the group,
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but it is imperative to know if those respondents are aware of how and why government spending
on social programs operates. Other methods of measuring collectivism may include an analysis
of political participation, contributions to charitable organizations, or the degree to which
someone holds certain family or community values that are not necessarily fiscally or politically
oriented. For the aforementioned reasons, my purpose in this study is to investigate just one of
the many different perspectives of collectivist values and it is not exhaustive of the entire range
of its potential measurement.

Analysis
The results of generational, socioeconomic, and sociodemographic effects on collectivist
values can be found in Table 2 below. The analysis indicates that generation is not significant in
two of the three models. Generation was coded in several different ways to verify that the results
were not a product of the coding. For example, one of these models placed Millennials and
Generation X into a unified group while Baby Boomers and the Silent Generation were placed
into another to more simply distinguish the younger generations from the older ones. While the
quantitative results were slightly different, there was no change in the substantive results that
would indicate that a respondent’s generation is a significant factor in determining collectivist
political values.
The outlying result from the generation variable is within the healthcare model. Baby
Boomers and the Silent Generation are statistically significant in comparison to Millennials,
while Generation X is not. This indicates that the two older generations are more supportive of
increasing federal spending on healthcare. These results support the MacManus theory that older
generations require more resources and are thus more supportive of higher federal spending.
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Older people require more resources for healthcare and would consequently support an increase
in government funding for such program. Despite the generational difference, this is likely more
so an age effect rather than a generational effect. In a similar vein, it is possible that if there was
another variable, such as support for federal spending on higher education, the younger
generations would be more favorable of it than older people due to the nature of such program
producing an age effect.
The regression shows that ideology is a highly statistically significant factor in
determining political attitudes towards social spending on collective programs. This was
expected as a result of conventional wisdom that indicates a difference in the role of government
based on personal political ideology. In each of the three dependent variables, ideology is
significant at a lower than a .001 level when compared to moderates, which indicates that
ideology plays a significant part in determining responses towards spending on these programs.
In each of the three dependent variables, Black respondents and Hispanic respondents were
shown to be different than White respondents at a 0.001 level. Respondents who selected
“Other” for race were shown to be statistically significant in comparison to White respondents in
their responses to federal spending on welfare programs and on healthcare. The former showed a
significance at the .05 level and the latter showed significance at the .01 level. The substantive
results were the same when other categories aside from White were selected as the base category
as a factor variable. There is no statistical significance between male and female respondents in
any of the models. The final independent variable is income, which is statistically significant at a
.001 level across the first two models but not statistically significant in the healthcare model. In
the first two models, the results show that as income increases, the respondent becomes more
likely to oppose federal spending on those programs.
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Income and race are both heavily influential on attitudes towards collectivist policy while
generation is not. These models demonstrate substantial support for the Wilson and Banfield
theory which suggests that socioeconomic and sociodemographic status, rather than generational
differences, affect levels of endorsement of collectivism in America. The Strauss-Howe
generational theory and the MacManus generational theory lack support from these results. If the
results of the Strauss-Howe generational theory were to be supported by this study, one would
expect to see a cycle of support wherein the Silent Generation would support federal spending on
collectivist programs in a manner similar to Millennials, while the Baby Boomers and
Generation X would oppose spending. Instead, there is no significance across generations. For
evidence to suggest that the MacManus generational theory holds true, the study would have to
demonstrate that the older generations are more supportive of increased spending. This holds true
in the healthcare model, but likely because it is an age effect and not a generational effect.
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Table 2
Ordered Logit Measuring Effects on Attitudes towards Spending on Social Policies

Generations
Generation X
Baby Boomers
Silent Generation
Ideology
Liberal
Conservative
Race
Black
Asian
Native American
Hispanic
Other
Sex
Female
Income

Aid to the Poor

Welfare Programs

Healthcare

-.03
(.11)
-.04
(.09)
.04
(.14)

-.07
(.11)
-.02
(.10)
.08
(.15)

.005
(.11)
.27**
(.10)
.40**
(.15)

1.11***
(.10)
-.81***
(.10)

1.31***
(.10)
-1.1***
(.10)

-1.20***
(.11)
-1.02***
(.10)

.96***
(.17)
.28
(.23)
.31
(.56)
.87***
(.15)
.27
(.20)

.70***
(.15)
.51*
(.22)
.29
(.59)
.49***
(.14)
.41*
(.20)

.92***
(.18)
.11
(.23)
1.5*
(.70)
.37**
(.14)
.59**
(.22)

.13
(-.03)

.01
(.08)

.001
(.08)

-.03***
(.005)

-.03***
(.005)

-.01
(.005)

N
2,641
2,641
2,641
Pseudo R2
0.11
0.14
0.11
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, two-tailed test; VIF scores indicate no serious
multicollinearity issues; Ordered Logit passes Brant test of Parallel Regression Assumption.
Millennials are the base category for Generations, Moderates are the base category for
Ideology, and White is the base category for race.
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CHAPTER III: ATTITUDES TOWARDS POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
Early social scientists, such as Mannheim and Ryder, have already demonstrated the
importance of studying generations within social science. Later inclusions of generational
differences, such as the studies conducted by Strauss and Howe, for example, have shown how
generation may influence individual values. It is imperative, however, to assess the methods by
which individual values ultimately influence institutions. Riker states that “people whose values
and tastes are influential live in a world of conventions about language and values themselves.
These conventions are then in turn condensed into institutions, which are simply rules about
behavior, especially decision making” (1980). Riker’s description of institutions seems cyclical
in a sense. People influence the development of institutions, which in turn govern the behavior
and values of people, which can then alter the development of later institutions. This cycle is
why generational perceptions of institutions are significant to study. An older generation may
develop the institutions in a manner that seems appropriate to them, which will inherently guide
the behavior of younger generations; however, as the younger generations become more
prominent in society, they have the ability to alter the future progression of institutions. These
may be different than younger generations that follow them.
Institutions are imperative for understanding collectivism because of their role within
human interaction. Moe asserts that self-serving, opportunistic individuals can approach
collective-action problems through institutions (2005). The political institutions that create the
American government, for example, are a form of bureaucracy that are created through collective
choice. Rules that are established by the powerful people within the institutions are projected to
everyone within the society. Younger generations are consequently subjected to the rules of the
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older generations. If one generation distrusts the institutions more than another, it is possible that
they view the collective nature of the institutions more negatively.
The cyclical development as described by Riker and the collective problem-solving as
described by Moe are why attitudes towards institutions are important to observe in a study about
generational differences in political values. A discussion of generational differences in attitudes
towards political institutions may elucidate some of the ways in which values are created and
shaped over a set period of time. Public opinion of American political institutions adds to a
conversation about collectivist values because of the nature of the institutions. A government
institution with more strength and authority is, by nature, collectively oriented as a result of the
powers granted to the institutions by the citizens. Consequently, a population’s trust in their
government and its institutions may be operationalized as a way to measure the levels of
collectivism within a population. An investigation of American citizens’ attitudes towards
political institutions may highlight another side of the collectivism discussion.

Research Methodology
In a democracy, political institutions are a manifestation of the powers that citizens have
granted their government. A citizen who trusts their government is therefore demonstrating faith
in the execution of those powers that the citizens have granted to their institutions. Political
institutions within a government execute the collective tasks that the people have assigned to
them in their inception. As a result, a citizen who is more collectively-oriented should have
higher levels of trust in their government to do what is right.
The dependent variable for this study is a measure of respondents’ trust in the
government to do what is right. The question asked “How often do you trust the government to
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do what is right?” It is coded in an ordinal scale. The variable was recoded so that “Never” is
coded as 1, “Some of the time” is coded as 2, “About half of the time” is coded as 3, “Most of
the time” is coded as 4, and “Always” is coded as 5. The independent variables are the same as
the first model: generations, political ideology, race, and income. Those variables are coded in
the same way as the first model. Political ideology in this model would potentially affect
respondents because someone with a liberal ideology in American politics would likely be more
trusting of the federal government, while someone with a conservative ideology would likely be
less trusting of the federal government. A liberal perception of the federal government may be
more positive because they are more likely to identify the role of the government as a safety net.
Conservatives, on the other hand, are likely not as trusting in the federal government because
they favor smaller government or government that is not centralized and more in the states’
control.

Analysis
The results of the regression can be found below in Table 3. The only generation that is
statistically significant in comparison to Millennials is the Silent Generation at a 0.05 level. This
indicates that the Silent Generation trusts the federal government more than the Millennial
Generation. Both liberals and conservatives are statistically significant at a 0.001 level in
comparison to moderates. This is potentially due to the ideological differences in overall opinion
of the role of government. Black and Hispanic respondents are statistically significant at a 0.001
level in comparison to Whites, but income is not statistically significant in this model.
The model indicates that there is a minimal difference in collectivist attitudes in terms of
political institutions. The oldest generation is significantly different than the youngest generation
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in their collectivist attitudes through political institutions. The model shows that the Silent
Generation is more collective in terms of institutions because they are more likely to trust that
the government, which is a collective problem-solver, will do what is right and expected of them.
This model offers some support for two of the three competing theories. The MacManus
study indicates that older generations are more collective because of a need for more resources,
which is somewhat supported by this model through the significance of the Silent Generation in
comparison to Millennials. The Wilson and Banfield theory suggests that socioeconomic and
sociodemographic status are more influential than generational differences, and that theory is
partially supported through the statistical significance of race, but evidence to support the
socioeconomic influence is lacking. The model fails to show support for the Strauss and Howe
generational theory as well. In order to show support for that theory, the Silent Generation and
Millennials would have to show similar levels in trust for the government, while Generation X
and the Baby Boomers would show lower levels of trust. The theory suggests that Millennials
and the Silent Generation should support stronger political institutions to overcome their
generational crises, but this model shows that only the Silent Generation does. Generation is thus
shown to have a minimal effect on trust towards the federal government, and therefore has a
minimal effect on levels of collectivism through political institutions.
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Table 3
Linear Regression Measuring Effects on Trust towards Political Institutions
Trust in Government
Generations
Generation X

-.02
(.04)
.04
(.04)
.13*
(.06)

Baby Boomers
Silent Generation
Ideology
Liberal

.17***
(.10)
-.30***
(.04)

Conservative
Race
Black

.35***
(.06)
.21*
(.09)
.21
(.24)
.32***
(.06)
.04
(.09)

Asian
Native American
Hispanic
Other
Sex
Female

.03
(.03)

Income

.002
(.002)

N
2,637
2
Pseudo R
0.08
Note: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, two-tailed test; VIF scores indicate no
serious multicollinearity issues; Ordered Logit passes Brant test of Parallel
Regression Assumption. Millennials are the base category for Generations,
Moderates are the base category for Ideology, and White is the base category for
race.
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CHAPTER IV: CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this study, I test several theories regarding the ways in which generational political
attitudes operate as collectivist values. One theory suggests that Millennials and the Silent
Generation should be more collective because of their development through specific crises.
Another theory suggests that older generations are more collective out of a requirement for more
resources and a lower ability to independently gain them. The last theory suggests that there are
no generational effects and that the primary determinant is socioeconomic or sociodemographic
status. After operationalizing political attitudes towards government spending on social
programs, the quantitative results indicate support for Wilson and Banfield’s theory which
argues that socioeconomic status and sociodemographic status are more influential than
generational differences. Consequently, I fail to demonstrate support for the Strauss-Howe
generational theory and the MacManus conceptualization of generational resource conflict using
this data.
An analysis of various models gauging the generational differences of opinion towards
political institution indicates that generations are also not significant when defining trust in the
federal government. Higher levels of trust indicate more collectivist attitudes. The Silent
Generation trusts the federal government more than the other generations and, consequently, may
be defined as more collective; however, political ideology and sociodemographic status were
also highly influential on trust in the government. As a result, there is some support for the
MacManus theory and the Wilson and Banfield theory.
Given the findings of this study, future researchers, politicians, and policymakers may
want to consider the lack of generational differences in collectivist values. In order to better
understand, predict, and create policies that are relevant to collectivist attitudes or responses, it
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may be imperative to focus on ideology and socioeconomic and sociodemographic differences.
This study is unable to identify evidence for any of the competing theories at an international
level, which may be helpful in order to identify whether or not global generations as a whole
experiences strong generational differences in collectivist political attitudes. It may also assist in
stifling a part of the generational conflict that was prevalent across different media sources
during the most recent national American election cycle. Further investigation is necessary, but
the charges against younger generations as being more self-centered or uninterested in assisting
different groups than older generations might be unwarranted in accordance with this study, and
thus may serve to reduce generational social conflict in some capacities.

30

WORKS CITED
Beck, Ulrich and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim. "Global Generations and the Trap of
Methodological Nationalism for a Cosmopolitan Turn in the Sociology of Youth and
Generation." European Sociological Review 25.1 (2009): 25-36.
Bond, Michael H., Kwok Leung, and Kwok Choi Wan. "How does Cultural Collectivism
Operate?" Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 13.2 (1982): 186-200.
Celinska, Katarzyna. "Individualism and Collectivism in America: The Case of Gun Ownership
and Attitudes Toward Gun Control." Sociological Perspectives50.2 (2007): 229-47.
Chen, Fang and Stephen G. West. "Measuring Individualism and Collectivism: The Importance
of Considering Differential Components, Reference Groups, and Measurement
Invariance." Journal of Research in Personality 42.2 (2008): 259-94.
Congressional Budget Office (2017). The 201 7 Long-Term Budget Outlook. p.iv.
< https://www.cbo.gov/publication/52480>
"The Generations Defined." Pew Research Center. 2017. Web.
<http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/11/millennials-surpass-gen-xers-as-thelargest-generation-in-u-s-labor-force/ft_15-05-11_millennialsdefined/>.
Hui, C. and Harry C. Triandis. "Individualism-Collectivism: "A Study of Cross-Cultural
Researchers"." Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 17.2 (1986): 225. Periodicals Index
Online.
Hui, C., Harry C. Triandis, and Candice Yee. "Cultural Differences in Reward Allocation: Is
Collectivism the Explanation?" British Journal of Social Psychology 30.2 (1991): 145-57.
Hui, C. "Measurement of Individualism-Collectivism." Journal of Research in Personality 22.1
(1988): 17-36.
Jennings, M. Kent, Laura Stoker, and Jake Bowers. "Politics Across Generations: Family
Transmission Reexamined." The Journal of Politics 71.3 (2009): 782-99.
Ken I. Kim, Hun-Joon Park, and Nori Suzuki. "Reward Allocations in the United States, Japan,
and Korea: A Comparison of Individualistic and Collectivistic Cultures." The Academy of
Management Journal 33.1 (1990a): 188-98.
Leung, Kwok, and Michael H. Bond. "The Impact of Cultural Collectivism on Reward
Allocation." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 47.4 (1984): 793-804.
MacManus, Susan A. "Taxing and Spending Politics: A Generational Perspective." The Journal
of Politics 57.3 (1995): 607-29.
Maniam, Shiva and Samantha Smith. “A wider partisan and ideological gap between younger,
older generations.” Pew Research Center. 2017. Web.
<http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/20/a-wider-partisan-and-ideological-gapbetween-younger-older-generations/>

31

Mannheim, Karl, and Paul Kecskemeti. Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952.
Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and
War." International Organization 56.2 (2002): 297-337.
McDermott, Gerald A. "Politics, Power, and Institution Building: Bank Crises and Supervision
in East Central Europe." Review of International Political Economy14.2 (2007): 220-50.
Moe, Terry M. "Power and Political Institutions." Perspectives on Politics 3.2 (2005): 215-33.
Pigou, A.C. "Real Income and Economic Welfare." Oxford Economic Papers 3.1 (1951): 16-20.
Radcliff, B. "Politics, Markets, and Life Satisfaction: The Political Economy of Human
Happiness." American Political Science Review 95.4 (2001): 939-52.
Ram, Rati. "Income, Distribution, and Welfare: An Intercountry Comparison." Economic
Development and Cultural Change 41.1 (1992): 141-5.
Riker, William H. “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rules for the Study of
Institutions.” American Political Science Review. 74.2 (1980): 432-436.
Ryder, N. B. (1965). The cohort as a concept in the study of social change. American
sociological review, 30(6), 483-861. Retrieved
from http://www.econis.eu/PPNSET?PPN=484011146.
Sivadas, Eugene, Norman T. Bruvold, and Michelle R. Nelson. "A Reduced Version of the
Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism Scale: A Four-Country
Assessment." Journal of Business Research 61.3 (2008): 201-10.
Sobieszek, Barbara I., and Richard G. Niemi. "Political Socialization." Annual Review of
Sociology. 3 (1977): 209-33.
Strauss, William, and Neil Howe. The Fourth Turning: An American Prophecy. 1st ed. United
States: Broadway Books, 1997.
The United States Census Bureau. (2017). Millennials Outnumber Baby Boomers and Are Far
More Diverse. <https://www.census.gov/newsroom/pree-releases/2015/cb15-113.html
Triandis, Harry C., and Michele J. Gelfand. "Converging Measurement of Horizontal and
Vertical Individualism and Collectivism." Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 74.1 (1998): 118-28.
Valentino, Nicholas A. and David O. Sears. "Event-Driven Political Communication and the
Preadult Socialization of Partisanship." Political Behavior 20.2 (1998): 127-54. Social
Science Premium Collection.
Whittier, Nancy. "Political Generations, Micro-Cohorts, and the Transformation of Social
Movements." American Sociological Review 62.5 (1997): 760-78. Periodicals Index Online
Segment 04.

32

Wilson, James Q. and Edward C. Banfield. "Political Ethos Revisited." The American Political
Science Review 65.4 (1971): 1048-62.
Wilson, James Q. and Edward C. Banfield "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting
Behavior." The American Political Science Review 58.4 (1964): 876-87.
Wolfinger, R. E., & J.O. Field. (1966). Political ethos and the structure of city
government. American Political Science Review, 60(2), 306-326.

33

